This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries, a familiar problem of coordination failure arises giving rise to multiple equilibria; any one of many possible trade agreements can form. With distance between countries, and through strategic interaction in tariff setting, regional trade agreements generate larger rent-shifting effects than non regional agreements, which countries use to coordinate on a unique equilibrium. Under naive best responses, regional agreements give way to free trade.
Introduction

1
show, in a two-country model, that rents made by foreign firms in the domestic market can be shifted back home by the government using tariffs. Yi (1996) uses a Brander-Spencer type model to show that a group of countries may obtain a higher payoff from TA formation than from moving to free trade. The present paper takes a special case of Yi's model in which goods are homogeneous and extends it by putting it in a regional setting.
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One of Yi's key results shows that a country would always prefer to leave its own TA in order to join another TA of equal or larger size, since the new TA that forms eliminates greater harmful rent-shifting effects and confers greater terms-of-trade benefits. However, in the present paper, a new effect is revealed when a regional dimension is introduced to the model. Without an agreement, since more rents are dissipated through transportation between regions than within them, there is more scope for rent-shifting within a region than across regions. TA formation within a region eliminates this greater harmful rent shifting among members, and in addition has greater beneficial terms-of-trade effects. Therefore, the value to a member of joining a regional TA of a given size is greater than the value of a TA across regions. This effect tends to push the countries of a region towards the formation of a regional TA.
In order to see the intuition behind this effect, consider the original proposals made in the 1960s for NAFTA -the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement -between Canada, the UK and the US. Interpreted within the context of the present model, Canada and the US would have liked the UK to form a TA with them, but the UK ultimately obtained a higher payoff from the formation of an agreement with nearby EU nations. This was so because the gains to elimination of rent shifting within Europe and the terms-of-trade gains over North America were of greater value to the UK. 6 To introduce the problem of coordination failure in the present context, TA formation is 5 Yi (1996) compares how 'open regionalism' can help with the attainment of free trade compared to the outcome under 'exclusive regionalism' in which TA membership must be unanimous. The present paper draws on Yi's analysis of exclusive regionalism and it does not address the question of whether open regionalism would be beneficial in a regional setting. In his study of exclusive regionalism, Yi (1996) identifies the stable equilibrium structure of TAs; an approach pioneered by Riezman (1985) that will be extended to a regional setting in the present paper. 6 The underlying intuition is robust to the fact that the NAFTA proposals were obviously for an FTA while the EU is a CU. In a broader setting, the choice of trading arrangement may have a significant bearing on the outcome. This point is made by Riezman (1999) , who endogenizes the decision by countries over whether to adopt a CU or FTA, showing that the choice of regime may affect whether free trade can be reached. (Also see Bloch's 2003 discussion of CUs versus FTAs, and Bond, Riezman and Syropoulos 2004.) modeled based on Hart and Kurz's (1983) simultaneous move exclusive membership game. In their original game, simultaneously and without communicating, each player writes down a list of other players with whom she would like to form a coalition. The lists form intersecting sets of players and each of the intersecting sets forms a coalition. But if two players fail to name each other then neither ends up in the same coalition even if it would have been mutually beneficial.
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In the model of the present paper each and every country, simultaneously and without communicating, writes down a list of others with whom it would like to form a TA. When transport costs between all countries are zero, so in effect there is no regional dimension to the model, the problem of coordination failure arises between them. Any one of many possible TAs may arise in equilibrium. When transport costs of trading between regions are greater than zero (but not large enough to prohibit trade between regions) countries use the difference in rent-shifting effects within and between regions to coordinate on regional TA formation. TAs form simultaneously, one in each region, and each TA includes all countries in that region. This is the sense in which the coordination problem is resolved when a regional dimension is introduced to the model. The model is highly stylized, particularly in terms of its regional structure. Nevertheless, even though strong assumptions are made about functional forms and the TA formation process, the results seem intuitively plausible and may be indicative of a general driving force towards regionalism for which there appears to be substantial evidence.
In general terms, the literature on regionalism addresses two issues. The first issue, which was the focus of Viner (1950) in his seminal work on the topic, concerns the welfare effects of TA formation and expansion. The second issue is with the stability of TAs. Given endogenous TA formation, what TA structures are stable? Are trade blocks conducive to or inimical to the eventual attainment of free trade? (see Bhagwati 1993 , although the roots of this question are found in Viner 1950 ). We will address both issues in this paper .
Firstly, standard results will be shown to carry over to the regional setting of the present paper in that TA formation and expansion tends to increase aggregate member welfare and hurts non-members. But we will add that a regional TA is worth more to its members than a non-regional block through rent-shifting and terms-of-trade effects. 
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Secondly, we will examine the issue of stability by considering the dynamics of regional TA formation. Yi (1996) argues that an equilibrium TA structure must be asymmetric.
Countries use the advantage in the sequence of TA formation that they are exogenously granted to form a larger TA. The countries in the larger TA are better off even than under free trade because they enjoy more favorable terms-of-trade effects over non-member countries.
As a result, TAs are inimical to the eventual attainment of free trade. In the present paper, no such advantages arise due to the fact that TA formation is simultaneous and so each country is uncertain about the outcome of the TA formation process. As a result TA formation can be symmetric, with no larger TA arising that would prefer the status quo to free trade. In that case regional TAs do ultimately facilitate free trade.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic trade model and uses it to explore the economic effects of TA formation in regions. Section 3 introduces the TA formation game. Section 4 shows that, in the TA formation game, when transport costs are zero there are multiple equilibria and no predictions can be made as to which will prevail. Section 5 then shows that when transport costs are greater than zero this provides a mechanism through which countries are able to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which regional TAs form. Section 6 then examines the extent to which regional TA formation may subsequently give way to free trade. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
A Model of Trade Agreements in Regions
We will work with a familiar model of international trade based on Cournot competition.
Let N be the set of countries. Each country, i, has a representative consumer, firm, and government, each denoted by its corresponding country identifier as i ∈ N .
There are six countries; N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. This is different from a standard TA 8 The literature on the dynamic path of trade liberalization examines the possibility that TA formation gives way to world free trade at a later stage. In addition to Riezman (1999) see Seidmann (2006) and Aghion, Antras and Helpman (2007) for recent contributions. Building on Baldwin (1996) , Krishna (1998) shows how political interests can undermine the progression from regionalism. Ornelas (2005a,b) shows that TAs may create problems for multilateral trade liberalization 'through their own success;' if governments can adjust tariffs then they only support trade-creating TAs, but then non-member countries may prefer to free-ride on such agreements, blocking a subsequent move to free trade. Ethier (1998) considers how multilateral liberalization may give way to regionalism. See Bagwell and Staiger (1998) on how TAs undermine the principles by which multilateral trade liberalization is achieved. Also, see Bagwati, Greenaway and Panagariya (1998) for a literature review on the dynamics of regionalism.
formation model, which would typically have just three countries. In our model, there is a regional structure that partitions our set, N , of six countries into two regions; R 1 = {1, 2, 3} and R 2 = {4, 5, 6}. A three-country framework is the simplest possible framework in which TA formation can be examined, since a minimum of two countries are required to form a TA and at least one country must remain outside so that the effects on a non-member can be analyzed. To extend this simple basic approach to a regional setting requires a set-up based on two regions, each of which has three countries.
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Regions are some distance apart from one another. Let d ij measure the distance between any two countries i, j ∈ N . To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we will say that if countries i and j are not in the same region then d ij = d while if i and j are in the same
So that we can examine whether TA formation evolves towards free trade, we will make the game of TA formation dynamic with three periods. The details of the game will be defined fully in due course, but it may be helpful to preview the game's extensive form to put the model in context. First, TA formation takes place. Next, taking trading arrangements as given, firms make production decisions. Finally, consumption takes place. We will adopt the usual inductive approach of solving this sequence backwards. Thus, in what follows it will make sense to assume that firms take the structure of trade agreements, tariffs and demand curves as given.
Preferences and Production
There are two goods in the model, denoted M and X. Good M is chosen as the numeraire.
Countries are endowed with equal quantities of M , which is transferred internationally to settle the balance of trade. The term M i measures consumption of M in country i. By assumption, each country is endowed with a sufficient quantity of M to ensure that it consumes a positive quantity in equilibrium. 9 This framework is general enough to demonstrate regionalism while being simple enough to yield clearcut analytical solutions. In the concluding section, we will discuss how the forces for regionalism under discussion may be examined in a more realistic regional setting.
10 Note that since all countries are endowed with M and produce X, there is no scope in the present model for trade diversion. That is, TA formation cannot lower welfare by inducing countries to import more from TA partners that do not have a comparative advantage. The gains and losses to TA formation here are driven instead by strategic considerations; this is a common feature of the recent literature. In the conclusions we will discuss possible extensions to a Heckscher-Ohlin setting in which trade diversion is possible.
All the firms in the model, one in each country, produce the homogeneous product X.
We will use x ij to denote the quantity produced for the market in country i by the firm in country j, and X i as the quantity produced by all firms for sale in country i:
Consumer preferences are approximated by the following quasi-linear function:
where e is a parameter. This functional form is relatively simple, focusing attention on the impact of product differentiation by distance.
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The inverse demand curve of consumer i is obtained in the usual way by differentiating (2.2) with respect to x ij :
Firm j's (marginal) cost to produce a unit of X for sale in country i consists of three components: a private per unit cost, c, which is the same for all firms; the tariff, t ij , levied by government i on imports from j; the transport cost, d ij , of shipping from j to i. Thus, firm j's per-unit production cost for each market i is given by the function
We will assume that firms perceive markets as being segmented, and so they compete by choosing quantities in each country. 12 Firm j chooses x ij to maximize profits in each 5) where p i is determined according to the inverse demand curve p i (X i ) given by (2.3) .
Setting the first derivative of (2.5) equal to zero obtains the first order condition for firm j; p i − c ij − x ij = 0. Summing first order conditions over all j ∈ N , in Cournot equilibrium, (2.6) 11 This basic functional form for preferences is used quite widely in the literature on TAs; see Ornelas (2005a) for example. Yi (1996) has a more general form which allows X to be horizontally differentiated. The model of this present paper could be extended in that direction but this would complicate the analysis considerably and would risk obscuring the effects resulting from the organization of countries into regions.
12 This assumption is made for analytical simplicity, but approximates the weaker assumption that firms compete over capacities.
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Output for market i by firm j depends negatively on d ij and t ij ; the smaller the distance to market, and the lower the tariff, the larger the rents available from shipping to country i and so the higher the quantity produced. In contrast, output by firm j depends positively on the distance from country i to all other markets and the tariff set by country i on imports from all countries other than j. Note that the strength of demand relative to cost helps to determine the rents available to firm j as well; e − c is common to all markets and can be made large enough to ensure that x ij > 0 for all i, j. 
Trade Agreements and Trade Volumes
The structure of TAs in the world economy is defined as follows. A TA structure B = (B 1 , B 2 , ..., B m ) is a partition of the set of countries N , where B 1 , B 2 , ... , B m are TAs;
has only one element then it is referred to as a singleton; a country that does not coordinate trade policy with others.
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Recall that the location of each country is fixed either in R 1 or in R 2 . Therefore,
Let b ir be the number of country i's TA partners that are in the same region as country i, and let b inr be the number of country i's TA partners that are in the "other" region. 15 In the present simple regional set-up, b ir ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
Using (2.6), we can now express outputs produced for country i in terms of regional and TA relationships. Let r stand for regional and nr stands for non-regional. Then t ir is the tariff that country i sets on imports from non-members in the same region and t inr is the tariff set on imports from non-members in the other region. Let m stand for TA member and let nm stand for non-member. Then we may use these mnemonics to classify outputs 13 The solution for x ij obviously depends on the assumption that there is only one firm in each country. Some work has looked at how TA formation is affected by a change in the number of firms; see in particular Krishna (1998) . From this earlier work, variation in firm numbers is most interesting when it is asymmetric. But since in the present paper we have already introduced a regional asymmetry to the model, we will leave aside formal analysis of variation in the number of firms across countries. We will discuss the probable effect of variation in the number of firms on our results in the conclusions.
14 In coalition formation, relations between countries are transitive; if countries 1 and 2 have an agreement and 2 and 3 have an agreement then 1 and 3 must have an agreement. In network formation, by contrast, relations may be intransitive; even if countries 1 and 2 have an agreement, it does not follow that 1 and 3 must have an agreement. Because the TA formation that we will consider involves coordination over external and internal tariffs, it implies a transitive relationship between members. 15 Formally, if i ∈ B k and i ∈ R l then let b ir be the cardinality of the set B k ∩ R l and let b inr be the cardinality of the set B k ∩ R m , l = m.
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into four basic terms. Write x irm for output produced for country i by a country that is in the same region as country i and is a member of country i's TA:
Write x inrm for output produced for country i by a country not in the same region but which is a member of country i's TA:
Write x irnm for output produced for country i by a country that is in the same region but not a member of country i's TA:
Finally, write x inrnm for output produced for country i by a country that is not in the same region and is not a member of country i's TA:
Total output is given by
By (2.7), the greater is d and the higher are t ir and t inr the greater the output produced by a regional member of i's TA for country i. (This expression also describes output by firm i for its own national market.) By (2.8) , the greater is d the smaller is the output produced by a non-regional member of i's TA for country i. Expressions (2.9) and (2.10) reflect the same basic intuition.
Welfare
Profits of domestic firms and tariff revenues are rebated back to consumers. Also, there is perfect competition in the world market for transportation. Based on these assumptions and the model set-up, country i's welfare can be expressed in terms of four economic components: domestic consumer surplus, C i ; tariff revenue, T i ; shipping revenue, D i ; the domestic firm's profit at home and abroad, π ii and j∈N \i π ji respectively (j = i)). Country i's welfare is denoted w i : 11) where
Because the transport sector is perfectly competitive, goods are delivered at cost and there is no surplus associated with that sector; D i = 0. This specification makes 'iceberg' transportation costs consistent with the present general equilibrium setting.
The next result shows that (2.11) may be expressed strictly in terms of outputs. Lemma 1. Country i's welfare, w i , may be written as
This result is familiar from the past literature. Equation (2.12) incorporates transport costs in an otherwise standard expression. Using (2.7)-(2.10), we can now express w i as a function of tariffs and the regional structure of the model.
Optimal tariffs
The members of a TA coordinate on setting external tariffs. The problem of the representative TA member, country i, may be expressed as follows: 13) where t ij = 0 for all i, j ∈ B k . Using (2.13) we are now in a position to determine optimal tariffs. Proposition 1. Assume that country i belongs to a TA of b ir regional members and b inr non-regional members. Country i's unique optimal external tariff on imports from a non-member in the same region as country i is
The unique optimal external tariff imposed by country i on non-members who are not in the same region as country i is
inr corresponds exactly to the optimal tariff found in previous literature.
16
If countries are identical, as in Yi (1996) , then the solution to (2.13) mandates that all members of a TA set the same external (joint-welfare-maximizing) tariff; they form a CU in other words. Here in the present setting, when countries are not identical (i.e. when d > 0), members have an incentive to set a tariff that discriminates between non-members based on their location. With equal tariffs, a firm would always export a larger volume to a nearby country because less of its rents are dissipated in shipping; its export supply elasticity is increasing in distance. This in turn motivates higher optimal tariffs on imports from the same region than on imports from the other region; t *
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The reason for adopting the derivation of optimal tariffs in Proposition 1 is for theoretical consistency with the past literature and in particular with our 'benchmark approach' taken by Yi (1996) . However, the analytical approach taken in the present paper may be 16 In Yi's model, under the specification of homogeneous products, his preference function replicates the expression for u i in the present paper, (2.2) . In the model of the present paper, if we let d = 0 and k = b ir + b inr and e − c = 1 then t * ir = t * inr = (1 + 2k) / 8 + 3k + 2k
2 . If we set n = 6 in Yi's expression for the optimal tariff, presented in his Proposition 1, we obtain τ (k) = (1 + 2k) / 8 + 3k + 2k 2 , where τ (k) is Yi's notation for the optimal tariff and n is Yi's notation for the number of countries. 17 For example, consider a two-country TA with one country from each region; say these are countries 1 and 4. Then country 1 sets tariffs t 12 = t 13 = t * ir (1, 1; d) > t 15 = t 16 = t * inr (1, 1; d) and country 4 sets tariffs
seen as unsatisfactory in practical terms because it does not require members of an agreement to set a common external tariff. The Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), adopted in the Charter of the World Trade Organization (WTO), requires that all members of the WTO set the same tariff on each others' imports. Article XXIV, which sets out the WTO rules on TA formation, defines an exception to the MFN principle in that members may allow entry of imports from other members at preferential rates. (Members must endeavor to remove tariffs completely on imports from other members). Nevertheless, Article XXIV requires that the MFN principle for non-members of the TA be upheld.
18 Under our approach, the TA that we analyze violates
It is straight-forward to address this issue by adding an MFN tariff constraint, t ir = t inr , to the tariff problem set out in (2.13), thus implying that any TA that formed must be a CU.
The resulting MFN tariff is a weighted average of t * the fact that larger rents may be shifted within a region by a given tariff, not that the tariff on imports within a region is higher. However, since the common external tariff is a weighted average of the tariffs presented in Proposition 1, it is significantly more cumbersome to work with. So we will base the analysis on the discriminatory tariffs presented in Proposition 1.
Article XXIV also stipulates that members may not raise tariffs on non-members when they form or expand a TA. It is straight-forward to check that t *
are decreasing in agreement size, so Article XXIV is satisfied in this respect.
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18 CU formation is consistent with MFN since, by definition of a CU, external tariffs must be common. 19 The results of this paper also hold under the more analytically straightforward but less interesting assumption that external tariffs are set at exogenously specified 'MFN' (i.e. common non-prohibitive) levels. The underlying assumption would be that tariffs were pre-determined by multilateral tariff reductions and that TA formation were taking place in that context. In summary, the results of the present paper concerning coordination on a regional agreement do not depend on the assumptions made regarding how external tariffs are set providing members do not compete with each other for third markets. This latter possibility will be discussed in due course.
Demand functions by region and TA membership
We can now use equilibrium tariffs t * (2.7)-(2.10) to write down expressions for equilibrium outputs produced for country i:
; (2.14) 
To restrict attention to positive output levels and positive optimal tariffs, the following standing assumption will be imposed throughout.
Thus, TA formation always entails the removal of positive tariffs.
20 Henceforth, the parameter d will be dropped from functional notation so that, for example, t ir (b ir , b inr ; d) will be written t ir (b ir , b inr ) and x inrnm (b ir , b inr ; d) will be written x inrnm (b ir , b inr ). 21 The reason for restricting attention to b ir + b inr ≤ 5 in Lemma 2 is because there are no non-regional non-members under free trade (b ir = 3, b inr = 3), and so it does not make sense to calculate a quantity for x inrnm (3, 3) . Using b ir + b inr ≤ 6 instead would not affect the results qualitatively.
TA Expansion and Welfare
In this subsection, we will look at the effect of (exogenously specified) TA formation and expansion on member and non-member welfare. We will follow Yi (1996) by looking first at the effect of TA formation on non-member countries. Yi shows (in his Proposition 3) that if a TA forms or expands, then non-member countries are adversely affected. We will now show that Yi's result extends directly to the present model. TA expansion may occur within a region (in which case b ir increases) or across regions (in which case b inr increases). Thus, define TA expansion as an increase in b ir and/or b inr .
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TA formation is just a special case of TA expansion in which all members of the TA that forms start as singletons.
Also note that TA expansion only affects non-members through the demand for exports. This is because optimal tariff setting of non-members is unaffected by TA formation. Thus we can evaluate the effect of TA formation on non-members entirely in terms of the effect on non-member exports to the TA, x irnm and x inrnm , and hence export profits. As a TA expands, and removes internal trade barriers, demand for X by consumers in member countries turns towards TA members and away from non-members, hurting the export profits of non-members. This result accords with Bond and Syropoulos (1996) in a perfectly competitive framework and Yi (1996) in an oligopolistic framework.
Others have obtained the opposite result, that TA expansion benefits outsiders; two key examples are Bond, Riezman and Syropoulos (2004, a competitive framework) and Ornelas (2005a, an oligopolistic framework). The key to this discrepancy lies in the fact that in the present paper, as in Yi (1996) , countries maximize welfare jointly when setting tariffs while in Bond, Riezman and Syropoulos (2004) and in Ornelas (2005a) countries maximize individual welfare while they agree to remove mutual tariffs. In other words, Bond and Syropoulos (1996) and Yi (1996) In an oligopolistic framework the discrepancy in outcomes can be attributed directly to a difference in the way export profits are treated by governments. Essentially the same effect operates in a competitive framework but cannot be attributed to firm profits since in that case the analysis is based on an endowment economy. A CU common external tariff maximizes the collective profit of all CU member exports to the rest of the world. The same feature is present in our model. In an FTA, by contrast, countries do not care about each others' export profits and hence compete in tariffs for third markets. Thus, while tariffs in the present model fall with TA expansion, they would fall more under FTA expansion, so much so that trade flows would increase not just between agreement members but between non-members as well. Thus both types of TA formation tend to hinder the move to free trade:
for CU formation this is so because members gain at non-members' expense and therefore do not wish to see them join; for FTA formation this is because non-members free-ride on the agreement, doing better by remaining outside it than by joining it. Our analysis will be based on the former set of interactions.
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Let us now examine the effect of TA formation on the welfare of members. Yi shows for his model that the joint welfare of countries involved in TA expansion increases (where 'joint' implies the welfare of existing members and new members). And more generally, if several TAs merge to form a larger TA the aggregate welfare of the member countries increases.
Yi remarks that consumer surplus displays a non-monotonicity that is present in underlying optimal external tariffs; the consumer surplus in member countries may first decrease and then increase as a TA expands. A country's export profits, on the other hand, may initially increase but ultimately decrease as the TA expands. The present model introduces a further ambiguity because there are two common external tariffs; the one levied on countries in the same region and the one levied on countries in the other region. Even though the economic environment is made more complicated by the regional dimension of the model, the next result shows that Yi's Proposition 4 extends to the present setting as well. All of Yi's results that we have examined so far extend to the present setting. These results have focused on the welfare effects of TA expansion on non-members and on the aggregate welfare of members.
Let us now focus explicitly on the welfare of individual member countries in the TA formation process. In doing so, we will show that a key property of Yi's identical-country model fails to hold when transport costs are sufficiently large but still in the range where trade flows between all countries are positive. Of course, Yi's result continues to hold when transport costs are sufficiently small.
Proposition 5. There exists a unique value
a country is better off in a (4-country) TA consisting of itself and all 3 countries in the other region than in a (3-country) regional TA in its own region.
country is better off in a (3-country) regional TA in its own region than in a (4-country) TA consisting of itself and all 3 countries in the other region.
For d ∈ [0, d ) this result is consistent with Yi's Proposition 8, which says that a member of a TA becomes better off if it leaves its TA to join another TA of equal or larger size. But
, our result says that a country is better off remaining in a 3-country TA within its own region than it would be if it left its regional TA to form a 4-country TA with all three countries in the other region.
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To understand the intuition behind this result, let us consider a member of a regional TA (in its own region), and ask whether it could gain by joining a regional TA in the other region. Say that country 1 is initially in a regional TA; 1 ∈ B 1 = R 1 . And say that the countries in the other region form another regional TA, B 2 = R 2 . Country 1 considers whether it could gain by leaving B 1 to join B 2 . Decompose the process into three steps:
(i) Original members of B 2 abolish tariffs on imports from country 1 and change tariffs on the other countries in R 1 from t * inr (3, 0) to t * inr (3, 1) ; (ii) Country 1 abolishes tariffs on all countries in B 2 , and levies tariffs at t * ir (1, 3) on its two former TA partners in B 1 ; (iii) The remaining two members of B 1 change tariffs on the (original) members of B 2 (who are located in R 2 ) from t * inr (3, 0) to t * inr (2, 0) and levy a tariff t * ir (2, 0) on country 1.
Consider the effect of each of these steps on the welfare of country 1 for d ∈ [0, d ) and
The abolition of tariffs by the members of B 2 has a positive impact on the welfare of country 1, because country 1 enjoys greater openness in three markets. (ii) country 1's abolition of tariffs on all three countries in B 2 also improves welfare but the implementation of tariffs on its two former TA partners in B 1 reduces welfare; the net effect is positive because access is increased to three markets while it is reduced in only two. (iii) Finally, the implementation of tariffs by its two former TA partners in B 1 reduces export profits and hence welfare in country 1. But the effect on exports of access to its three new partners in B 2 (in step (i)) more than compensates. The positive effect on consumer surplus from net tariff removal in moving to the larger TA is greater than the negative effect on tariff revenue and the loss of domestic profits from greater competition in the domestic market. Thus, a key result of Yi's is overturned in the present model with the introduction of transport costs. This is significant because it shows that a country will not leave a TA in its own region to form or join a TA in the other region, even if the new TA that forms is larger. In Yi's characterization of an equilibrium TA structure, based on the property that a country would always leave a TA to join a larger one, the first TA to form is always the largest and the last is always the smallest. Proposition 5 therefore calls into question whether, in a regional setting, the TAs that form in equilibrium are necessarily asymmetric in size.
One is bound to ask whether the tendency towards regionalism presented in this result is specific to the model we are using here. Interestingly, Egger and Larch (2006) show that exactly the same effect prevails in a generalization of Krugman's (1991) constant-elasticityof-substitution model of regionalism. Egger and Larch (2006) have three regions, each of which has two countries. They present simulations in Figure 4 of their paper to show that, with relatively high intercontinental transport costs, a country would rather form a (two country) regional TA than form a (three country) TA by joining a TA with two countries from another region. This suggests that the tendencies towards regionalism derived in the present model extend to other settings as well.
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A natural question to ask next is whether the members of a regional TA would invite a country from the other region to join them. The next result shows that, once again, the answer depends on the size of transport costs. This result is again in keeping with Yi (1996) . A group of countries can obtain a higher level of welfare than under free trade by forming a TA while non-members remain as singletons. In Yi's model (with six countries and homogenous goods) the highest level of welfare is achieved by a country when it forms a TA of four members. This continues to be true in our model for d ∈ [0, d ), i.e. when transport costs are small. When transport costs are larger, i.e. for d ∈ [d , (e − c) /22), a country does better by forming a regional TA (only with members from its own region). The reason is that the terms-of-trade benefits of TA formation increase with transport costs, and these benefits are increasing in the number of countries left outside the TA. In either case, to maximize national welfare, the TA of which a country is a member must include all of its regional partners.
We are now in a position to see why it would not have been an option for us to adopt Yi's approach of using Bloch's (1996) 'size announcement' game to model TA formation in the present regional setting. 26 The application of that game to the present framework would be the following. All countries are placed on a list, say 1, 2, ... , 6. Country 1 would be asked to announce the size of the agreement that it would like to form. Then, all proposed partners (following subsequently from country 1) would be asked to agree or disagree. If a proposed partner disagrees then it is asked to make its own proposal of a TA and, again, 25 Egger and Larch (2006) identify these effects to make sense of their empirical investigation of tendencies towards regional TAs.
26 See Bloch (1996) for further discussion of equilibrium existence issues when players are not identical. it proposes a TA consisting of itself and countries 5, 6 and 1. This is a mirror of country 1's original proposal. It is now clear that no equilibrium would exist in this situation. 27 In addition to providing a way to capture the coordination problem in TA formation, the TA formation game presented in the next section also provides a way around this equilibrium existence issue.
The TA Formation Game
As argued in the Introduction, a country has many potential options for partners when seeking a TA, and this creates potential for coordination failure. We will capture this problem formally by basing the TA formation process on the δ-game of Hart and Kurz (1983) . We will now set out the salient features of the TA formation game and how these reflect aspects of the TA formation process that we want to focus on. Hart and Kurz (1983) consider four simple coalition formation games, denoted by α, β, γ and δ. The common element in all of these games is the selection procedure by which each and every player simultaneously and without communicating writes down a list of the other players with whom she would like to form a coalition. After the players have completed the selection procedure, they are able to observe the membership of the coalitions that will potentially form. The difference between the four games is the notion of stability; the description of what happens if one or more player wishes to leave the proposed coalition having observed the potential membership. For our purposes, an appealing feature of the δ-game is that if, having learned the identity of coalition members, any player wishes to leave a coalition she can do so while the coalition otherwise remains in tact. 28 This captures a feature of TA formation, which seems to reflect actual practice, that if one proposed partner chooses not to go ahead with the TA then the others may still do so.
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A second feature of actual coalition formation that we will capture here is that countries who approach each other to form a TA have more information about the prospective membership of their agreement than countries who have not approached each other. In the TA formation game, we will adopt a particularly tractable form of this assumption; within a period, each country only finds out about the prospective TA membership of its own TA partners. We adopt this approach from Arnold and Wooders (2005) , who introduce this informational friction in their formalization of club formation.
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This assumption replaces the assumption made by Hart and Kurz (1983) that each country has the same information about the coalition formation activities of all others. In an abstract setting the approach of Hart and Kurz is undoubtedly more appealing. Yet in the present applied setting our assumption seems to capture an important aspect of the informational frictions that are likely to slow down the actual process of TA formation.
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In formal terms, the informational friction serves to introduce a degree of stability and consequently enlarges the set of possible equilibria. After we have shown that the set of equilibria is potentially large, we will then show how the introduction of a second friction, that of transport costs, reduces the number of equilibria to one.
The game lasts three periods; t = 0, 1, 2. The process is initialized at t = 0 with a TA structure in which there are no TAs; initially the TA structure, B, is the set of singletons. 28 In the γ-game, by contrasting example, all players in a proposed coalition return to singleton status if one player leaves. The α-game and β-game embody similar variations in coalition stability. 29 For example, even though Britain dropped out of the original discussions to form the European Economic Community (which later became the EU) the original signatories to the Treaty of Rome still went ahead in 1957.
30 Arnold and Wooders (2005) use the word 'club' in the same sense as Hart and Kurz (1983) use the word 'coalition'. Both concepts correspond to the notion of TA as we use it here. 31 Even if a country can deduce that it is in the national interests of another group of countries to form a TA in response to its own TA formation activities, the assumption will be that it does not act on the deduction; it waits to respond until that TA has actually been observed to form. An interpretation of this assumption is that countries attach a degree of 'political uncertainty' to the TA-formation process due to possible distributional or politically-motivated concerns of policy-makers which cannot be observed from outside the country.
Within each period t ≥ 1, the sequence of events is as follows. At the start of the period, each country observes the TA structure of the previous period. Then, each country i chooses a strategy, s i , where each s i contains a list of countries in N with which country i would like to form a TA; this list includes country i itself. 32 The strategy space, S i , for country i is the set of all subsets of N , i.e. the set of all possible TAs that could include country i. Strategies are chosen simultaneously. During the TA formation process, a country only observes whether or not it ends up in a TA and, if so, it sees which other countries are its TA partners. A country does not observe the strategies of other countries. We will say that, during the TA formation process, if a country does not observe another country as its TA partner, it maintains the assumption that the trade policy of that other country is described by the TA structure B of the previous period. This assumption ensures that a TA forms if and only if there is unanimous support for its membership. If a country finds itself in the position of being in two or more otherwise exclusive and otherwise unanimous TAs, it chooses the TA that maximizes its payoff under the assumption that the memberships of the TA that it joins and the TA that it leaves remain otherwise constant. 33 When a country chooses one TA over another one, it assumes that the other goes ahead without it. In order for a new TA to form by the merger of more than one existing TA, all members of all merging TAs must agree to the new one.
Under the assumption that countries observe the TA structure given by B in the previous period and take this as given, it is not possible to break up an existing TA in the process of forming a new one. Therefore, the assumption introduces a degree of inertia into the formal characterization of existing TAs. Countries are unable to force out existing TA partners once a TA has formed. In one sense, like the assumption that countries only observe their own TA membership during the TA formation process, this is theoretically restrictive. But again the 32 The purpose of including i in s i is that then we can view B k as the intersecting set of all the elements of strategies s i for all i ∈ N .
33 Pushing this one step further, any two countries caught between two TAs will assume that each behaves in the same way as the other in the TA that they choose. This assumption is the same as that of Hart and Kurz, that if any player is caught between two coalitions then it chooses the biggest one under the assumption that all other players caught in the same situation do the same. In a world where all countries are identical this assumption is innocuous. In principle this assumption could lead to mistakes in a world where countries differ but this potential problem will not be an issue for any of the situations that we will study. assumption seems reasonably realistic, in that it reflects actual practical restrictions on the cessation arrangements of existing TAs. For example, with regard to the EU, any member of the Council of Ministers has the power to veto membership of a country that would like to join, but there is no way to force out a country that is already a member. The present formalization reflects exactly this type of arrangement. Each strategy vector s = (s 1 , ..., s N ) induces a unique TA structure, B, and so we can now write B as a function of s; B (s):
Since a TA structure implies a unique value of b ir and b inr for each country i, and since these in turn imply values of t * ir (b ir , b inr ) and t * inr (b ir , b inr ), the payoff to country i associated with s can be represented simply as w i = w i (t ir (B (s)) , t inr (B (s))); the payoff for country i from the TA structure induced by s. For compactness, we may write w i = w i (s).
The notion of equilibrium is adapted from Arnold and Wooders (2005) . For any given TA structure B = (B 1 , ..., B k , ..., B m ), a strategy vector s * ∈ S is a Nash club equilibrium of the TA formation game if for any given B k ∈ B there is no Z ⊆ B k and s ∈ S such that
By definition, an equilibrium exists if no group of countries Z in some TA, B k , can do better by deviating. In formal terms the difference between our assumption and that of Hart and Kurz may be understood as follows. Hart and Kurz allow deviations to be undertaken by any coalition Z ⊆ N (in contrast to our restriction of deviations to Z ⊆ B k ). Thus, our definition weakens the notion of equilibrium relative to Hart and Kurz, admitting a relatively large number of equilibria. In particular, it does not exclude from the equilibrium set candidates that arise as a result of coordination failure -in the present context, where countries could all benefit by merging their proposed TAs but fail to do so due to the informational friction. It remains to be shown how the problem of coordination arises when all countries are identical and is resolved when countries may differ by region.
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The Problem of Coordination Failure
We will now show how the problem of coordination arises in a world where all countries are identical. To do so, we will fix d = 0. By Proposition 6, we know that a TA of four countries maximizes the welfare of its members (if the other two countries are singletons). The problem of coordination failure arises because, even if each country writes down a strategy s i with four elements, in the absence of communication there are many possible TA structures that may arise in equilibrium as a result of all countries playing this strategy. An equilibrium may arise in which there is a TA with four countries, which is the desired outcome of each of the members. But of course the two countries excluded from the four-country TA do not achieve their desired outcome. Moreover, this is not the only TA structure that can be sustained in equilibrium. We will first consider an equilibrium in which there is a four-country TA, but then consider one of many possible alternative TA structures that may arise when all countries seek to form a TA with four members.
Various equilibria with coordination failure
An example of a strategy vector, s, that gives rise to an equilibrium in which there is a four-country TA is as follows:
Notice that the strategies s 1 ...s 4 form an intersecting set of elements {1, 2, 3, 4} while 5 is only listed in s 6 (and s 5 of course) and 6 is only listed in s 5 (and s 6 ). Thus, the resulting trade agreement structure is {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5, 6}}. It is easy to check that no country can gain by deviating from this agreement structure and so therefore this must be an equilibrium. Consider the allowable deviations. If a member of the four-country TA were to veto membership of another single member then the TA structure would become one of a three-country TA, a singleton and a two-country TA, for example {{1, 2, 3} , {4} , {5, 6}}.
Then, since welfare is maximized in a TA of four countries, the payoff to the country that undertook the veto would fall, as would the payoff of the ejected member. The welfare of 5 and 6 actually increases. If more than one country's membership is vetoed, it is easy to check that the payoff of remaining members falls even further. Therefore, no member of the four-country TA has an incentive to deviate. The same is true for the two-country TA. Thus
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we have a Nash club equilibrium.
We have already discussed above the reasons why TA member welfare changes when one or more countries are ejected. Let us briefly review why non-member welfare changes. We just noted that, from an initial trade agreement structure of {{1, 2, 3, 4} , {5, 6}}, if country 4 is ejected, leaving a trade agreement structure of {{1, 2, 3} , {4} , {5, 6}}, then the welfare of 5 and 6 increases. Why does this happen? Tariffs set by 5 and 6 do not change because these depend only on their own TA structure, which has not changed. When 4 is ejected, countries 1, 2 and 3 restore tariffs against it, and as a result demand less of X from 4, shifting some of their demand towards 5 and 6. With all else equal, this puts the trade accounts of countries 5 and 6 into surplus, requiring an improvement in their terms-of-trade to restore equilibrium. This adjustment occurs within the model via an increase in the flow of profits to the firms in 5 and 6. In addition, 4 restores tariffs against countries 1, 2 and 3, shifting its demand for X towards 5 and 6. Both of these effects combine to shift profits towards 5 and 6, thus increasing welfare.
Notice that, because d = 0, the partition of countries into regions has no relevance to this equilibrium. As specified, the equilibrium contains three countries from R 1 and one country from R 2 . But under an equivalent characterization of equilibrium we could have permuted the countries in such a way that two countries were in R 1 (say 1 and 2), and two countries were in R 2 (say 3 and 4). This is due to the fact that all countries are identical.
We shall see that the partition of countries into regions does become relevant for equilibrium when d > 0. Now let us consider another possible equilibrium in which there are three TAs, each with two members. This equilibrium arises if each country proposes to form a four-member-TA consisting of itself and the three countries 'next to it': 
By inspection of the strategy vector, the agreements that form are {1, 4}, {2, 5} and {3, 6}. Again, it is straight-forward to check that this is an equilibrium strategy vector.
If any member of a two-country agreement vetoes membership of the other, splitting the agreement into two singletons, then its payoff falls by (the reverse of) Proposition 3. This is the only feasible deviation.
Transport Costs and Coordination
The problem of coordination failure identified in the previous section is resolved in the presence of a transport cost d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22) . Note that the transport cost may be arbitrarily small. anticipates obtaining the highest level of welfare from a regional TA with only the two other countries in its own region. Thus, it is immediate that the intersecting sets formed by countries' strategies is two regional TAs; B 1 = R 1 and B 2 = R 2 .
The case where d ∈ (0, d ) is slightly more subtle. In that case, each country's welfare is maximized by a 4-member TA with three members from its own region and one member from the other region. But even if all countries write down a strategy containing four countries, three from its own region and one from the other region, the intersecting sets of countries formed by these strategies give rise to two regional TAs; B 1 = R 1 and B 2 = R 2 . To see why, consider the following strategy vector: No country can gain by deviating from this agreement structure and so therefore this must be an equilibrium. Consider the allowable deviations. If a member of one of the regional agreements were to veto membership of another single member then the agreement structure would become one of a two-country agreement, a singleton and a three-country agreement;
for example {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5} , {6}}. Then the payoff to the country that undertook the veto, in this example country 4 or 5, would fall. The welfare of countries in the regional trade agreement that remains, {1, 2, 3}, increases. As before, if more than one country's membership is vetoed, it is easy to check that the payoff of the remaining member falls even further. Thus, no member of a regional agreement has an incentive to deviate. No deviation is available to the singleton. Thus we have a Nash club equilibrium. This is the only possible equilibrium that can arise for transport costs in the interval d ∈ (0, (e − c)/22)). In equilibrium the TA structure is symmetrical, so each country receives the same payoff. By Proposition 4, the payoff that each country receives must be lower than under free trade.
Clearly, the informational friction is necessary for this outcome. If countries had complete information about each other and were far-sighted then each would anticipate that the countries of the other region would form a TA as well. Then each country would be able to see that a move to free trade would be more beneficial. But we can also see how the present assumption regarding informational frictions captures aspects of uncertainty that are likely to be present in the actual process of TA formation across regions.
Do Regional TAs Facilitate Free Trade?
We have seen how, for d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22), two regional TAs emerge at stage t = 1. We now proceed to stage t = 2 and ask whether free trade can emerge at this point. We find that it does. The thinking is as follows. At the beginning of period t = 2, each country observes the TA structure described by B from period t = 1, at which point there were two regional trade agreements; B 1 = R 1 , B 2 = R 2 . Countries would be able to secure the same payoff at t = 2 as at t = 1 by maintaining the existing TA structure. However, each is able to obtain a higher payoff by moving to free trade. (In the next result, the reference to t = 1 replicates Proposition 1 and is included for completeness.)
There is a unique equilibrium path. At t = 1 there are two regional TAs; B 1 = R 1 , B 2 = R 2 . At t = 2 there is world free trade.
How can free trade be an equilibrium at t = 2 but not at t = 1? At t = 1, from free trade, by Proposition 6 a country has an incentive to veto the membership of two or three countries from the other region (depending on whether
Each country operates under the assumption that the countries whose memberships were vetoed would return to singleton status since that was their status in the network B at t = 0.
At t = 2 the outcome is different. All excluded countries return to the TA structure given by B at t = 1; {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5, 6}}. By Proposition 7, the payoff to such a deviation is not profitable as it is lower than free trade. Thus, we have shown that free trade is a Nash club equilibrium at t = 2. Regional trade agreements do ultimately facilitate free trade in this setting.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to show that problems of coordination failure in the formation of TAs may be resolved when countries are organized into regions. Costs of shipping goods between regions must be significant, but not so high as to eliminate trade between regions. With no transport costs, there is a problem of multiple equilibria due to coordination failure familiar from the theory of coalition formation. Positive transport costs are enough to bring about a unique equilibrium in the first period of the TA formation game. Starting from a situation where there are no TAs, in the first period two regional TAs form simultaneously. In the second period the two regional TAs merge to bring about free trade. The attainment of free trade only after a period of regionalism rests on a friction in the flow of information through the TA formation process and on uncertainty about the TA formation activities taking place beyond the boundaries of each agreement. Members can only communicate about their agreement once they have simultaneously and independently chosen their TA partners.
Inevitably, the theoretical framework developed here simplifies the situation in a number of key respects. The underlying economic structure of the model is one of Cournot competi-tion in a homogeneous product. In practice, the forces of competition are understood to be more subtle and complex. Future research could take steps to see the extent to which the insights of the present model extend to alternative settings. It seems reasonable to argue that the features of our model which drive regional TA formation would extend to other forms of competition. In particular, it is widely appreciated that Bertrand competition behaves like
Cournot competition when firms must pre-commit to quantities. A more elaborate modeling of perfect competition should also exhibit the same features, as suggested by Bond (2001) .
The key motivating feature of the model is that, in the absence of an agreement, there would be greater rent shifting within a region than across regions. This feature of the model is motivated by the presence of transport costs and will be robust to alternative assumptions about competition between firms and tariff setting between governments.
It also seems reasonable to argue that the features of the model would extend to a more elaborate model of production. A direct way to make such an extension would be to assume that X is horizontally differentiated, extending preferences and production accordingly. Alternatively, Syropoulos (2002) offers a way to investigate whether the insights of the regional model developed in the present paper could be extended to a Heckscher-Ohlin framework. This would take explicit account of how differences in factor endowments would interact with countries' organization into geographical regions. Syropoulos also offers a way to consider whether there is an incentive to delegate trade policy setting to a country that is deemed to have more tariff-setting power due to its geographical location, because it is closer to non-members for example.
A question that arises through our analysis is how the results would be affected by the trade regime. Our results are based on the assumption that countries coordinate on the setting of external tariffs as in a CU (except that TAs do not necessarily set common external tariffs in our framework). Outcomes might look different if countries were to form FTAs instead. In real life it is CUs that appear most often to be regional, the most prominent examples being the EU, MERCOSUR and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).
All are formed between countries that have contiguous borders. On the other hand, the recent proliferation of FTAs has included countries which are not close to each other, such as the aforementioned FTA between South Korea and the US. This seems to suggest that the forces towards regionalism may operate more forcefully in CUs than in FTAs. This in turn begs the question of what drives the choice of trade regime; the question addressed by Riezman (1999) . Thus Riezman presents an approach which could be used to address the question of which trade regime would be adopted within the present regional framework, and if an FTA were adopted whether it would necessarily be regional.
One question that should be addressed in future research on this topic is whether the model predictions are robust to more elaborate country models and more realistic regional structures. How big must the asymmetries across regions get before problems of multiple equilibria re-emerge? How big must the asymmetry be in the numbers of firms across countries before the result that countries prefer a regional-only agreement breaks down even when transport costs are large? When will the presence of asymmetries preclude the eventual move to free trade? Here Ornelas (2005b) might be helpful. Our model could be combined quite naturally with his to examine the way that asymmetries affect the regional outcomes that we have demonstrated in the present model. An alternative way forward would be to extend the framework of the present paper to incorporate more sophisticated and realistic simulations-based models of the kind developed by Whalley (1985) .
A focus of some research on regionalism is on situations where tariffs are used for political or redistributive purposes. 34 Such considerations could be incorporated in the model of the present paper by putting a heavier weight on producers' profits. It seems possible that producer interests which span regions, as between the UK and the US for example, could counteract the forces towards regionalism identified in the basic framework.
Another interesting line of research would be to investigate how variation in the assump- 
A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The basic proof strategy was suggested by Monika Mrazova for a different model in Mrazova, Vines and Zissimos (2007) . First note that π ij = (x ij ) 2 and π ji = (x ji ) 2 ; by (2.5) we have π ij ≡ (p i − c ij ) x ij and by the first order condition of (2.5) we have that p i − c ij = x ij .
Next, the first four terms of (2.11) may be written
where we have used the fact that D i = 0 by assumption and line 3 uses (2.3). On the other hand, the first four terms of (2.12) may be written
where the second line uses (2.2) , the fourth line uses (2.4) and the first order condition of (2.5) , and the seventh line uses (2.3) . The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Government i 's problem, as expressed in (2.13), simplifies to
The first order condition with respect to t ir is
The first order condition with respect to t inr is (e − c − 1)
Using (2.7)-(2.10) and their first derivatives, a reduced form for each of the above first order conditions may be obtained. Since the objective function is globally concave in t ir and in t inr , there exists a unique symmetric solution for each:
Solving simultaneously for t * ir and t * inr obtains the result.
Proof of Lemma 2. The fact that Proof of Proposition 2. It must be established that dx irnm /db ir < 0, dx inrnm /db ir < 0, dx irnm /db inr < 0, and dx inrnm /db inr < 0 over the range of feasible b ir and b inr . Each case will be taken in turn. Differentiating x irnm (b ir , b inr ) with respect to b ir , we obtain
Differentiating x inrnm (b ir , b inr ) with respect to b ir , we obtain
The second term in the numerator is positive and increasing in b ir , b inr and d while the first term is negative. It is easily checked that overall the numerator is negative for b ir = 3, 
After simplification, we see that
be the case that dx inrnm (b ir , b inr ) /db inr < 0 for all feasible {b ir , b inr } pairs and d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22).
Proof of Proposition 3. The strategy of proof follows Yi (1996) . Assume that there exists a TA structure B = (B 1 , B 2 , ..., B m ) and that two or more TAs, say B 1 , B 2 ... B r , merge to create an enlarged TA. We will show that the total welfare of the members of the enlarged TA increases. To do this, we will show that the tariff changes required to implement TA enlargement undertaken by any one given member of the enlarged TA must increase the aggregate welfare of all members. Thinking of TA enlargement as a sequence of such tariff changes by each and every member then gives the result. Proof. Without loss of generality, consider the TA B 1 , of which country 1 is assumed to be a member. B 1 has b 1r members from R 1 and b 1nr members from R 2 . Then let membership expand to create an enlarged TA, B 1 , consisting of b 1r members in R 1 and b 1nr members in R 2 (where all original members are also members of the enlarged TA). The comparative statics exercise that we will now carry out is as follows. We will calculate the effect on the aggregate welfare of all countries in B 1 that results when country 1 abolishes tariffs on h 1r countries in R 1 and h 1nr countries in R 2 , and changes tariffs on (3 − b 1r − h 1r ) non-members
First consider infinitesimal changes in tariffs
dt ≡ (0, ..., 0, dt, ..., dt, dt r , ..., dt r , 0, ..., 0, φdt, ..., φdt, dt nr , ..., dt nr ) from a tariff vector t ≡ (0, ..., 0, t, ..., t, t r , ..., t r , 0, ..., 0, φt, ..., φt, t nr , ..., t nr ) ,
where: dt appears from the (b 1r + 1)th element to the (b 1r + h 1r )th element; φdt appears from the (b 1nr + 4)th element to the (b 1nr + h 1nr + 3)th element, unless b 1nr = h 1nr = 0 in which case dt nr appears from the 4th to the last element; dt r appears from the (b 1r + h 1r + 1)th element to the 3rd element; dt nr appears from the (b 1nr + h 1nr + 4)th element to the last element. The tariff t was already being imposed on new TA members in the same region and is reduced to zero through the TA formation process. The tariff φt (i.e. φ × t) was already being imposed on new TA members from the other region, where φ = t 1nr /t 1r (see below for specification of t 1nr and t 1r ). Also,
Start from
where 0 appears from the first to the (b 1r + h 1r )th element and from the fourth to the (b 1nr + h 1nr + 3)th element (unless b 1nr = h 1nr = 0). We can move to
where 0 appears from the first to the (b 1r )th element and from the fourth to the (b 1nr + 4)th element (unless b 1nr = 0) by integrating the infinitesimal changes dt from 0 to t (b 1r , b 1nr ).
Below, we will show that d j∈B 1 w j /dt < 0 for all t along such a path of integration.
The claim then follows.
Since changes in country 1's tariffs do not affect sales in other countries,
whereŵ 1 is country 1's welfare net of its exports. Sincê
The proportional relationship between t 1r (b 1r , b 1nr ) and t 1nr (b 1r , b 1nr ) is given by
Note that φ = 1 for d = 0 and 0 < φ < 1 for d ∈ (0, (e − c) /22). The total tariff at the tariff vector t is
The change in the total tariff is calculated from dt as follows:
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The following notation will also be helpful:
From (2.4) and the first-order-condition of (2.5), we have
. Therefore we have:
Using these results,
where:
The proof that are the optimal tariffs of the size b 1r + b 1nr TA on 3 − b 1r regional non-members and 3 − b 1nr
non-regional non-members respectively, given free trade among the b 1r + b 1nr members.) It remains to show that, at t (b 1r , b 1nr ), the terms Ξ 1 and Φ 1 are both strictly negative. (Of course, due to oligopoly distortions, Ξ 1 and Φ 1 could only be zero if trade subsidies were allowed).
At t (b 1r , b 1nr ), x 11 =, ..., = x 1b 1r +h 1r , x 14 =, ..., x 1b 1nr +h 1nr +3 (unless b 1nr = h 1nr = 0, in which case x 14 =, ..., x 1b 1nr +h 1nr +4 ), and t = 0. Also, X 1 = b 1r x 11 + (3 − b 1r ) x 1b 1r +h 1r +1 + b 1nr x 1b 1nr +h 1nr +3 + (3 − b 1nr ) x 1b 1nr +h 1nr +4 ;
Then we have Ξ 1 = −4x 11 + b 1nr x 1b 1nr +h 1nr +3 − (3 − b 1r ) (x 11 + x 1b 1r +h 1r +1 − t 1r (b 1r , b 1nr )) − (3 − b 1nr ) (x 1b 1nr +h 1nr +4 − t 1nr (b 1r , b 1nr )) . Now, observing that x 11 = x 1rm , x 1b 1r +h 1r +1 = x 1rnm , x 1b 1nr +h 1nr +3 = x 1nrm and x 1b 1nr +h 1nr +4 = x 1nrnm , we can use (2.7)-(2.10) to substitute for x 11 , x 1b 1r +h 1r +1 , x 1b 1nr +h 1nr +3 and x 1b 1nr +h 1nr +4 , which obtains Next observe that, after simplification,
− (3 − b 1nr ) (x 1b 1r +h 1r +3 + x 1b 1nr +h 1nr +4 − t 1nr (b 1r , b 1nr )) − (3 − b 1r ) (x 1b 1r +h 1r +1 − t 1r (b 1r , b 1nr )) .
Adopting the same basic approach used to simplify Ξ 1 , we then have We can see straight away that for d = 0 it is the case that Φ 1 < 0, and that Φ 1 is increasing in d. We then find by substitution that for d = (e − c) /22, b ir = 3 and b inr = 2, it is the case that Φ 1 = 0. It follows immediately that Φ 1 < 0 for all b 1r ∈ {1, 2, 3} and b 1nr ∈ {0, 1, 2}
and d ∈ [0, (e − c) /22).
Step 2. We can write the second order condition directly as The second welfare function measures welfare when country 1 joins a TA with the countries in the other region while countries 2 and 3 form a TA. To calculate w 1 {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5, 6}}, note that country 1 sets a tariff t * inr (3, 0) on all imports from the other region, and country 1's exports also face t * inr (3, 0) from all countries in the other region. Trade within regions is free. Using these tariffs in (2.7)-(2.10) and substituting the resulting expressions into (2.11), we obtain w 1 {{1, 2, 3} , {4, 5, 6}} = 3 387 (e − c) 2 − 134 (e − c) d + 1072d 
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For w 1 {{1, 4, 5, 6} , {2, 3}}, country 1 sets t * ir (1, 3) on imports from non-members in its own region. country 1's exports face tariffs t * ir (2, 0) from non-members in its own region. Trade between country 1 and the countries in the other region is free. Using these tariffs in (2. names every other country in R 2 in its strategy. Therefore, the intersecting set of countries formed by the strategies of countries in R 1 is R 1 itself. So we have a regional TA, B 1 = R 1 .
Symmetrically, the intersecting set of countries formed by the strategies of countries in R 2 is R 2 itself. So we have a second regional TA, B 2 = R 2 . A deviation by country 1 would then yield welfare w 1 {{1, 2}, {3}, {4, 5, 6}} or w 1 {{1}, {2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}}, neither of which would be profitable relative to w 1 {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}}. The result follows. Now take d ∈ (0, d ). Given that all countries are singletons in the previous period, by Proposition 5 , each country i writes down a strategy s i listing itself, the two other countries in its region, and one country from the other region. Thus, each country in R 1 names every other country in R 1 in its strategy plus one country from R 2 . Symmetrically, again by Proposition 5, each country in R 2 names every other country in R 2 in its strategy plus one country from R 1 . But no country in R 1 names every country in R 2 and no country in R 2 names every country in R 1 . Therefore, the intersecting set of countries formed by the strategies of countries in R 1 is R 1 itself. So we have a regional TA, B 1 = R 1 . Symmetrically, the intersecting set of countries formed by the strategies of countries in R 2 is R 2 itself. So we have a second regional TA, B 2 = R 2 . The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 8. By Proposition 4, aggregate member welfare increases when a TA expands from 3 members to 6 members (free trade). The two regional TAs, B 1 = R 1 and B 2 = R 2 are symmetrical, so each country has the same welfare. Thus, the welfare of every country must be increased by the merging of the two 3-country TAs to bring about 41 free trade. Moreover, no country can gain by deviation because a veto of the grand coalition must result in a return to the TA structure of B 1 = R 1 and B 2 = R 2 .
